What’s
Wrong Today:
On
Wednesday, the Wrongologist wrote,
“What do we know about Turkey?” The idea was to provide some insight into a
long-term ally, one that is undergoing dynamic change in both domestic and global
strategy.
How
does America fit within the simultaneous equations that all of our allies are constantly solving? Today we review Turkey’s
military posture and how it is changing as its global strategy changes.
We
said that Turkey is an ally of the US, it is member of NATO. We have had nuclear
weapons in country since 1957 and have about 70 nuclear weapons in 24
underground vaults at the Incirlik air base. Turkey is on
record as seeking a nuclear-free Middle East.
Turkey’s nuclear
strategy has been focused on Russia, both as a possible enemy and as a trade
partner. As a member of NATO, Turkey was a potential launch point for intermediate
range nuclear missiles, which were removed at the time of the Cuban Missile
Crisis. For decades, it has been a forward base for the US Air force, but
Turkey’s focus is now turning to the Middle East.
Turkey’s
domestic nuclear program is focused on building nuclear power plants due to its
growing energy needs and a desire to reduce its reliance on foreign
suppliers. Although it identified Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear program
as a threat in the 1990s, Turkey has not pursued its own nuclear weapons
capability. In May, Turkey and Japan agreed to a $22 billion deal in which four
nuclear power reactors will be built at Sinop on the Black Sea. The deal marks
the start of Turkey’s second nuclear power project, after it reached a similar
deal three years ago with a Russian consortium to construct four reactors at
Akkuyu near the Mediterranean.
Turkey
wants to develop its own missile shield to protect from longer-range cruise
missiles, or from short-range ground-to-ground missiles launched by Middle
Eastern antagonists, like Iran or non-state terror groups. They are also
concerned about drone or ballistic missile attacks. NATO has an integrated
system of defensive missiles and incoming missile detection systems designed to
defeat such attacks. But, Turkey may want to go off on its own.
Turkey is
thinking about sourcing part of its missile defense from China. As the South China Post reported;
in January, Turkey
restructured its US$4 billion surface-to-air missile program, dubbed T-Loramids,
which was an off-the-shelf purchase consisting of radar, launchers and
intercept missiles. As a NATO member equipped with the US’ Patriot air defense
systems, Turkey had been urged by its Western allies to remove China and Russia
from its bidding list for air defense projects because of differences between
their systems. But Ankara has publicly declared interest in adopting the
Chinese HQ-9 missile system. Burak
Bekdil, Turkey’s defense correspondent for Hurriyet Daily News and Jane’s
Defence Weekly, reports
that Turkey “is strongly leaning toward adopting a Chinese long-range
anti-missile and air defense system”.
The HQ-9
is reported to have the capability to track and engage aircraft, ballistic
missiles, and low-and-slow flying cruise missiles. The technical data suggest
that it is similar to the
United States’ Patriot.
The South China Post also reported that Emre Kizikaya, an
Istanbul-based political commentator, said the main problem with selecting the
Patriot is America’s unwillingness to
share know-how and software codes. Somehow, Turkey believes that China
will be willing to share.
Since the HQ-9
system cannot be integrated with NATO’s early warning radar network, Turkey
will not be able to link the HQ-9 with NATO’s planned alliance-wide missile
defense shield. The Alliance plans rely on the US’ SM-3 ship-based
missile interceptor, now in testing, for defense against a regional ballistic
missile threat. Turkey has said it is likely to purchase the SM-3 for its
fleet.
Thus, NATO
has a layered missile defense system capable of firing
multiple interceptors at incoming missiles to give a high probability that
the target is destroyed. The system relies on a network of American deployed
ground based radars (the radar at Malatya, Turkey is one), space based sensors,
and early warning satellites.
If Turkey chooses
the Chinese missile, it could still benefit from the Alliance missile shield, but
it would not be linked to NATO’s early warning system. An incoming missile
aimed at Turkey may not be detected as
early as it might be otherwise. Turkey will still be reliant on NATO for
its ultimate protection, which raises questions about why Ankara would purchase
a system that is not interoperable with NATO’s. Could this be just a
smokescreen to drive a better deal with the US?
Possibly. Raytheon
(the Patriot manufacturer) is unwilling to meet Turkey’s demanding offset requirements. (Offset is a legal trade practice in
the aerospace and military industries. The sale of a system to Turkey may
require the seller to purchase an equivalent amount of Turkish goods). Others
think that the Chinese have agreed to a co-production arrangement for the
missile and will invest in a production facility for the system inside Turkey,
a Turkish priority.
Since the
1980’s, Turkey has sought to build its domestic arms industry through
co-production deals for military procurements. If the task is too great
for Turkish defense firms, Ankara prefers co-development agreements, or, if that
proves to be impossible, they prefer co-production/co-licensing agreements.
For example,
Turkey’s tank is based on a co-production deal with South Korea’s Hyundai and
its attack helicopter is a co-production agreement with Agusta-Westland, a European consortium.
Turkey’s policy is not unique; 130 countries have similar co-production/offset policies.
So, should
we be worried about the direction of our long-term ally? Not clear, China held a joint military exercise in Turkey’s
Konya province, in 2010, marking the first time China had sent troops to a NATO
country.
Now, China might get its
nose under the tent of Turkey’s strategic air defense.
When we
hear that Turkey might go its own way on defensive weapons procurement, possibly
making deals with our rival China rather than the US, the reasons may have less
to do with our relationship or our future as allies.
It may have
more to do with purely domestic considerations.
