Does NATO Have a Winning Strategy for Ukraine?

What’s
Wrong Today:


Events are
overtaking the narrative of the US and Europe propping up a new, West-leaning
government in Ukraine. There is a possibility of a major escalation, well beyond
the current war of words between Russia and the West.


What
should NATO’s response be to a deeper incursion into Ukraine by Russia? What
are the risks to us? Risk assessment begins with the fact that we are supporting
a weak, unstable, but friendly government in Kiev. It abuts the Russian army,
which has articulated a promise to protect Russian nationals abroad in their
military doctrine since the early 1990s.


It
is in our (and NATO’s) interest that this situation not escalate. Ukraine needs
to establish a process for long-term reconciliation with the Russian-speaking
population in Eastern Ukraine to hold off a Russian incursion.


That
may be impossible. Edward
Luttwak, a writer on strategy, believes:


Actually
the Crimea is not what the Russians want—they want much more. The “Novy Russia”
plan prepared in the Kremlin—worked out in detail down to the design of its
flag—would separate all the territory east of the great Dnieper River into a
new state, “affiliated” with the Russian Federation, until its accession can be
worked out in due course


The
Dnieper as a dividing border gives Crimea to Russia including its naval base. A
Dnieper border has the decisive advantage of enclosing a population that
includes many ethnic Russians, many Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and many
Ukrainians who see their future with Moscow because their livelihood depends on
Russian firms or is in Russia itself. The map below shows how the Dnieper
neatly divides Ukraine:



The
US, Europeans and NATO now face a hard choice: Either start a new “cold war” of
non-cooperation with Moscow, or else join in a process of defining a non-failing state out of the current Ukraine,
west of the Dnieper.


Putin
will not be socialized into a policy of acceptable international conduct. He is
an expansionist, and he is willing to use force. How and where will we contain
him? Do we raise the price of military intervention so high that he won’t try this
again?


When the
USSR folded, NATO changed from a
defensive organization to an offensive one, aiming at expanding its power
and reach into the Baltic states of the former Soviet Union. The question today
is, does NATO have a balanced strategy of deterrence and containment for the
current threat posed by Russia in the Baltic? The answer is no.


Russian troops
along Ukraine’s border show no signs of leaving, and Russian President Vladimir
Putin has done little to suggest that Russia’s ambitions stop at Crimea. So, it falls to NATO to
re-evaluate their strategy vis-Ă -vis Russia. NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow said
exactly that in a speech last week:


For 20 years, the
security of the Euro-Atlantic region has been based on the premise that we do
not face an adversary to our east. This premise is now in doubt


He also
said that Russia’s actions against Ukraine were a wake-up call for the
Euro-Atlantic community. So, it is clear
that the current series of events were not part of NATO contingency planning,
despite the fact that the triggering events in Ukraine were orchestrated by the West.


However, most believe
NATO will do little to deter Russia. You
don’t have to be a Chicken Hawk Republican to worry that Putin may radically
alter the “facts on the ground” in ways that a strong (or stronger) US/NATO
action could be too late to
head off. So, what should NATO
do? Sean Paul Kelly asks:


Why is no one
willing to consider making the Ukraine a buffer state?


The West
gives up its goal of having Ukraine be a part of NATO and Russia allows the
Ukraine to become a neutral republic, similar to Finland. Kelly says the risks
of military involvement far outweigh the rewards of having the Ukraine in the
US orbit.


A hostile Russia
could do great harm to Western interests globally, particularly in Iran and
Syria today, or in China in the future. In short, a permanently hostile and
threatening Russia is not in anyone’s interest, including Ukraine’s.


We need to think clearly about our goals in
Eastern Europe and weigh them against our greater global strategy. This work is not
done by reading a comic book, or watching a summer blockbuster movie, it takes
thinking and planning.


Yet today, 20
years after the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, it
is clear that the US has not consolidated any advantage geopolitically,
nor has it used its “peace dividend” productively.


Happily returning
to a Cold War mentality is the path that most of DC and all of the neo-cons
want for America. It will take a very tough-minded President Obama to blunt these
calls for intervention. Our national interest is not threatened in Ukraine; our
interest is in solving this crisis without committing troops and without spending
any more than the $1 billion we have already committed to Ukraine. That will require Europe to come to a consensus about what to do. After all, they are more threatened by Russia, both economically and militarily.


Let’s
start on that path today.

Facebooklinkedinrss