“You can’t always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you might find, you get what you need” – Rolling Stones

Democrats seriously suck at politics. On the other hand, you can fight the opposition, you can fight the media, you can fight the money, and you can fight vote suppression.

But, idiocy is damned near invincible. And sadly, idiocy is pretty well distributed across party lines:

After a massacre on par with the catastrophic election of 2010, 2014 proves that you hold elections with the citizens you have. Democrats didn’t accept that reality. As the Wrongologist said on November 3rd:

The Democrats have no closing argument. The great tragedy of the Democrats is that they still believe politics is about competing sermons.

They ran to the right, distanced themselves from the Obama agenda, and hoped that their ground game would bring them victory. It didn’t, and it’s not going to be easy to get the same quality of GOTV effort that Obama got in 2008 and 2012, after coming up so short this time. If you look at the political map, what you see is red and purple counties in suburban and rural areas that taken together, in low turn-out elections, are now equal to anything that solidly blue urban areas can muster. This problem prevents any Democratic effort to undermine the ability of Republicans to successfully gerrymander secure districts.

Are establishment Democrats who are now on their way to their lucrative post-political careers, going to have the will to fight for anything before they go? Beltway Democrats have a lot to answer for. And one question is whether the Democratic Party is more than a regional party that can win in only a few coastal states. Their political infrastructure has now mostly gone to seed. Here is a modest program for improvement:

1. The old guard leaders must go. The Democratic caucus should throw out the entire leadership team and start over. Why would any candidate want to brand themselves with the organizations run by Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, Debbie Wassermann-Schultz, Steve Israel, and whoever it was that allowed Democratic Senate candidates to run this year’s content-frees campaigns?

2. They should look at the political landscape: People are discontented. Why? In part, because incomes haven’t risen in 15 years. What did Democrats do in response? Nothing. What did voters do? They voted enmasse for the party that has done everything possible to keep their incomes down. Apparently, any change was better than more of the same inaction.

3. They need to listen to constituents. The current bunch are over-manipulative, over-controlled, and fools for the money. Over the past 30 years, the Wrongologist has met with Governors, Senators and Congress people to push policy ideas. But today, what mostly comes out of those meetings (if they will take them) are platitudes and polite put-downs.

4. They need to realize that good Ideas can come from the people: The purpose of Occupy Wall Street was to drive the 1%-99% inequality idea. It gained traction. Everyone knew it was true, but Democrats could (or would) not operationalize any policy from the idea. They let the bankers off the hook, while mildly pushing tax reform and the Minimum Wage. Maybe what we saw last night was the “Revenge of Occupy”.

People tend to believe what Republicans say about Democrats, instead of what Democrats actually say about themselves. Their peer-pressure techniques block out reasoned political conversation. This has the effect of isolating people, and convincing them that everyone around them believes Republican-speak, and that to cross that line will result in personal approbation, or possibly, social excommunication.

Allowing this to continue has been the greatest failure of Democratic leaders.

The problem is that people either don’t know what the Democrats and the Republicans stand for, or don’t really care. Based on the Pew poll of voting types, nonpartisans have no idea who runs what in Congress.

If we can get voters to understand what Republicans are for and what Democrats are for, there could be Democratic majorities even with the level of turnout we saw yesterday. This is “branding”, and Democrats have to stop letting the R’s do it for them.

Look, we’ve made surprising progress on some issues in the past 6 years. The gap is with connecting the winning issues to the winning candidates. Unless the Democratic Party changes, it is a casket for progressive ideas and candidates.

Sources:

TGIF. We head into the weekend with music. Except today, when the musician, the late Ritchie Havens, delivers the spoken word at a favorite Georgetown undergrad hang for the Wrongologist, The Cellar Door.

If you ever saw him live, Ritchie Havens was a force of nature. This is from the Wrongologist’s eulogy:

Havens took his teeth out to sing. Apparently he cared more about how he sounded than how he looked. If you have that much talent, you don’t need teeth. He just sat there with his guitar and sang his songs. He didn’t have a persona, he had no guile.

Havens was also political. Often at concerts, he told the story of being an avid
follower of comic book superheroes, especially, Superman, who fought for
“Truth, Justice, and the American Way.” Here he is explaining just how incongruous the concept (was) is:

See you on Sunday!

What’s Wrong Today:

Here is some perspective from two former presidents on the possibility of our returning to war. First, from Gerald Ford, speaking about Vietnam, at Tulane University in April, 1975: (h/t to Rachel Maddow writing today in the WaPo)

And the money quote is from Thomas Jefferson:

So it is with Mr. Obama and the Middle East. He has the wolf by the ears. Some of our erstwhile allies on the Arabian Peninsula are encouraging a radical Sunni uprising in Iraq, and in Syria. It’s part of a regional, sectarian war, and we should have no interest in furthering the violence on either side. Bush’s team empowered Iran with the destabilization of Iraq. Then, Mr. Obama’s decision in Syria helped push our Sunni allies (Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) to go all-in with AL-Qaeda types in Syria. Let’s take another look at a map of the Sunni-Shia divide that we posted about a year ago:

Since the 1930’s when we first recognized Saudi Arabia, we have tried to straddle the fence with our choice of allies in the Middle East. Turkey (NATO member) is Sunni. So is Saudi Arabia. Our enemy AL-Qaeda is Sunni. Our “enemy” Iran is Shia. Our “ally” Iraq is Shia. So what did we think would happen when we deposed Sadaam’s minority Sunni government and replaced it with a majority Shia government in Iraq?

Since Assad has fought  ISIS (Sunni) to a standstill, they have now moved part of their operations into Iraq to further inflame the regional situation, so that the US will be required to intervene, something that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Oil States and neo-con supporters of Israel have been advocating for some time.

Today, we have no real allies among the Muslim states in the Middle East. So, do we stay on the sidelines or do we go in with both feet? Mr. Obama, on Face the Nation:

That doesn’t sound like in with both feet. Mr. Obama went on to say:

Yet, neo-cons think that ISIS is a perfect tool for two American goals. First, they think ISIS helps in the removal of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, something which would make Israel very happy, since it would weaken Iraq’s connection to Iran.

Second, ISIS could be an excuse for American air attacks. If ISIS could be forced back into Syria by American jets, it could create an opportunity for Assad to continue to do the dirty work for both America and Iraq.

Andrew Bacevich, in an interview with Bill Moyers, took down the neo-cons, particularly Dick Cheney and Robert Kagan:

Bacevich calls out the neo-cons, specifically, Kagan: (brackets by the Wrongologist)

He goes on to say we look for easy solutions: (emphasis by the Wrongologist)

We have been engaged in the Muslim world at least since 1930’s, based largely on the assumption that projecting American military power could somehow “fix” this part of the world, or at least secure our access to its oil resources.

So, we now have a track record to review. We intervened militarily in Lebanon in 1982. In Somalia. In Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. And Yemen.

Has the region become more or less stable? Has it become more democratic? Is there less anti-Americanism? The answer to all of the above is no. So, it is time to recognize that US military intervention in the Middle East has failed as a primary means of US policy.

Despite all the testosterone running rampant in Washington, we are not going to meet our goals by simply bombing more Muslims.

The events unfolding in Iraq right now require a debate around the question, “what should we do about Iraq?” The nation-state of Iraq was never a particularly good idea, but it plodded along for most of the 20th-Century with a series of kings and dictators at the helm. President George W. Bush ended that Iraq, and it is very doubtful that it can be saved.

Neither Iran nor the US has an interest in a protracted civil war in Iraq. And both the US and Iran have an interest in greater stability in this region. More from Bacevich: (emphasis by the Wrongologist)

All efforts should be focused on creating a negotiated settlement and new boundaries rather than preserving Syria and Iraq as coherent nation-states. It is unlikely that they will ever be coherent nation-states again.

We need a new approach to our participation in the Sunni-Shia divide, one that keeps America from intervening again. Shortly after Mr. Obama was inaugurated, he went to Cairo and gave a speech that proposed a new beginning in the Middle East, a new beginning of US relations with the Islamic world.

Whatever happened to that President Obama?

“You may not be
interested in war, but war is interested in you.” – Leon Trotsky

The truth in
the quote attributed to Trotsky is the fact that more than 14,500 armed
conflicts are recorded in history. They have killed at least 3.5 billion
individuals.

And thus, Iraq
returns, VERY interested in America.

It arrives hot
on the heels of Ukraine, Syria, Libya, The Central African Republic and a dozen
other places.  

Mr. Obama seems unable to articulate
what our strategy in Iraq should be. Since nature doesn’t tolerate a vacuum, up
steps the “Iraq Pack” as Steven Colbert calls them:

He means politicos John Bolton, John McCain, George W. Bush, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney, who were so very wrong about the Iraq War, but now feel compelled to again tell us what to do.

Salon reports that Colbert declared war on Mr. Cheney’s testicles:

Republicans knee jerk reaction to Obama:

The GOP’s reactions are influenced by facts on the ground:

Iran could be “frenemies” with us in the Iraqi conflict:

And in other news, Dan Snyder has issues with the Redskins trademark:

Kevin McCarthy finds the swamp wasn’t drained by Eric Cantor:

What’s Wrong Today:

Mr. Obama did not call for air strikes in Iraq in his announcement today. That was not what Senator McCain (R-AZ) wanted to hear. McCain wants US airstrikes in the region, if for nothing other than boosting Dick Cheney’s morale.

It is possible, but not likely, that surgical strikes might restore some stability to Iraq, at least near Baghdad, but hope is not a sufficient basis for a foreign policy decision. Iraq is trying (unsuccessfully so far) to cope with its sectarian divisions. It may have acted as a nation in its war against Iran, but that ended in 1988, and it doesn’t feel like a nation any more. As Jim Kunstler asks: “Have they tried diversity training?”

Probably not.

This is not the first time we have heard from Mr. McCain on Iraq. Regarding the potential challenges of a conflict in Iraq, here is a quote from 2002:

Regarding at least part of the reasons for war, consider this 2003 statement by McCain to FoxNews:

This was his view yesterday from The Hill:

McCain said yesterday that political reconciliation between Islamic groups in Iraq is key to peace, but, that it can’t be a “prerequisite for military action”.

Whatever.

We need a comprehensive debate about our strategy in the Middle East and specifically, in Iraq. The debate should be explicit and public, since if/when Iraq descends into chaos or breaks up, there will be further recriminations from our opportunistic politicians and pundits, and the question of “who lost Iraq?” (As if it is ours to lose) will drive our political discourse for many years.

McCain could start by answering the question: Where do airstrikes fit into our overall strategy? Does he have an answer other than there is the big money to be made building drones and Hellfire missiles to blow up Toyota pickups filled with jihadis?

After 8 years, $2+ trillion dollars spent, 4500 American lives sacrificed, 50,000 wounded (plus those of the Iraqis), can the sum total of what was achieved by the US in Iraq be this harvest of ashes?

It might be. Our 8-year nation-building experiment achieved little of substance. Tactical strength on the ground did not overcome strategic weaknesses in the form of Iraq’s demographic divide, its geographic location and porous borders.

Another question is: Which of the following options should we choose?

(a) Stand aside and watch the most virulently hostile anti-American force in the world carve out a swath of territory in Iraq and Syria to use as a base of operations; or

(b) Re-establish a “coalition of the willing” and insert a level of direct military force into Iraq in order to aid the Baghdad government. The peacekeepers should be mainly comprised of soldiers from Arab countries in the Middle East.

Staying out may allow circumstances to unfold which later compel intervention against a direct security threat, like in Afghanistan in 2001.

From a regional geo-political perspective, it is important to note that Israel supports the Kurds. Turkey and Saudi Arabia support ISIS. The USA supports “moderate” Jihadists in Syria. The Obama administration wants a regime change in Baghdad, giving Nuri al-Maliki the boot. Imagine, we want to bring about TWO regime changes in Iraq in 13 years. A coalition of the willing might suffer from the same sectarian divide that is already seen on the ground.

Neither course is certain to meet our Middle East goals. Either course will result in creating more anti-American anger among a large number of dangerous people. If America supports Maliki directly while he declares emergency powers and cracks down on certain groups, it will re-establish our old pattern of US support for antidemocratic strongmen.

That has not served us well in the Middle East.

It appears that the partition of Iraq is about to become a fact on the ground, if not in the minds of some in Washington. The Malaki government cannot retake Anbar Province without outside help, from Iran or the USA. This January, ISIS took over Fallujah (in Anbar Province), 40 miles west of Baghdad, and has held it ever since, despite artillery and air counter attacks. Below is a map that outlines the approximate borders of the sectarian groups in Iraq:

No matter what course we choose, our actions will be seen as insufficient by one side, and an atrocity by the other.

No peace will be gained, but much enmity will accrue to our image in the Middle East.

Let’s close today with a quote from a blog post by Brian Dowling in 2006:

As you see, NOTHING has changed in the intervening 8 years.

Sorry, but if Iraq devolves into 3 states who wage a low-grade war among themselves, so be it. If one of those states creates a haven for anti-American jihadists, we will deal with that when we must.

Our choice today is not between a unified postwar democracy and chaos. Some form of Iraqi democracy has emerged, but a unified democracy does not exist, and may never exist.

It is not a choice between victory and defeat.

It is a choice between a foreign policy based on ideology and hormones, and one based in reality.

What’s Wrong Today:

Yesterday’s column asked about our goals in Iraq, and our willingness to default to military action whenever a crisis emerges. Since that is our reflexive reaction, let’s take a quick look at how effective our military operations in the Middle East have been. Ian Welsh wrote: (brackets and emphasis by the Wrongologist)

The military as a tool of national strategy is designed to use its resources to inflict costs (loss of territory, weapons and fighters) on the enemy, which the enemy cannot easily replace. Or, that the financial costs of replacement are beyond the ability of the enemy to pay.

In a sense, war fighting is often a battle of attrition of resources, and generally, one side prevails. That was the history of warfare in the 20th century.

Our 21st century experience with fighting Islamist militias is instructive. Our military is brutally expensive. Islamist militias are cheap. The Taliban funds itself with blackmail and drugs. Until they broke the bank in Mosul for $425 million, ISIS ran on donations from rich Muslims along with some state support. Now they are self-funding.

These Islamic armies cost peanuts compared to the US, British or Israeli military. And they are capable of tying down Western militaries for years, using up huge financial resources, and even winning. Hezbollah defeated Israel, which was (before Hezbollah proved otherwise) widely considered one of the most effective militaries in the world. We were held to a tie in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

A military that is hundreds of times more expensive than its main competitor has problems, particularly in a long war. In military operations, effectiveness is most important. But if your effectiveness doesn’t actually deliver a win, in the sense of making your enemies stop fighting, then a hugely expensive military will indeed bleed us white in a prolonged state of warfare.

Our military is aware of these facts: We use drones because they are cheaper than planes. Ground combat robots, which the US army is working to perfect, may ultimately be cheaper than human soldiers, as well as offering the advantage of requiring fewer troops, meaning fewer combat casualties.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, our military leaders completely underestimated the strategic importance of the IED. When the insurgents deployed IEDs, the costs of American occupation soared, and our maneuverability, a perceived strength, slowed to a crawl. Now, IEDs are simply the 21st century version of land mines. It was understandable that our generals thought that we knew how to detect and beat the mine, but with the IED, a cheap and primitive weapon, entire areas of Afghanistan became “no-go” zones, where our troops could only move in convoys of exceptionally large armored vehicles. Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) caused by IEDs has become a major cause of US casualties in both Iraq and Afghanistan, with soaring costs for extended rehabilitation when the injured soldier returns to the US.

Our generals have not been able to blunt the effectiveness of IEDs, even though we own the most advanced military technologies since the dawn of human society.

We also have a political problem. America is no longer willing to accept high levels of casualties. We, our politicians, and therefore our generals, try exceedingly hard to avoid large numbers of dead and wounded in our “wars”. This has made successfully occupying space in a foreign country impossible. If we are occupying a province or a city in a foreign country, and the lives of our troops come first, we will shoot first and ask questions later. It is better strategically if we accept higher losses than it is to kill innocents in tribal societies, even though that is a very difficult ask of our military. When we kill an innocent, an extended family then hates America. Even if they don’t take up arms, they will then provide support to the insurgents.  

Our soldiers stand out in a Middle Eastern culture. US soldiers did not speak Arabic, did not dress like Iraqis or Afghanis, did not practice the predominant religion or understand its culture. To our troops, all locals became the enemy, and to the locals, the occupying forces come to be seen as the enemy. This is true despite efforts to train our troops to work with locals.

The most amazing fact is that all of this is known/taught/accepted by US military leaders, but they seem to be incapable of behaving differently, or to change the tactics on the ground sufficiently to enable a “win”.

So the West uses highly expensive troops whom we don’t want to die, along with drones, close air support and extensive surveillance. And the Islamic militias, on budgets that aren’t even shoestring by US standards, survive and grow stronger. They are evolving: They communicate via Twitter, we use UHF radios with big, heavy batteries. They get smarter all the time. They are Darwinian organizations: screw up, and you die.

But, in his book, The Generals, Thomas Ricks d
emonstrates that a culture of mediocrity has taken hold within the Army’s top leadership rank, and if it continues, the country’s next war is unlikely to produce better results than the last two. Nor is there much of a relationship between an officer’s battlefield performance and subsequent promotions. He quotes an American civilian official based in Afghanistan in 2007:

Ricks wrote in the Atlantic that the tactical excellence of enlisted soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan may have enabled and amplified the strategic incompetence of the generals in those wars. The Army’s combat effectiveness lets its generals dither for much longer than they could have if the Army had been suffering clear tactical setbacks. He quotes Sean McFarland, brigade commander in Ramadi in 2006: (emphasis by the Wrongologist)

Despite our 13 years of military experience on the ground in the Middle East, our strategies, tactics and weapons remain essentially the same, and they haven’t worked well enough to deliver the strategic objectives we hoped they would.

So, which are the effective methods of stopping or defeating an insurgent or terrorist force in Tribalstan™?

• Kill and/or expel the insurgent militias
• Play ethnic groups against each other
• Colonize the provinces with jobs, infrastructure, schools, and a new legal regime
• Some combination of the above?
• Something completely different?

As a thought experiment, how exactly could the US “win” on the ground in the Middle East, given our current military?

If we cannot “win” on the ground in the Middle East, where does the use of military force fit in our Middle East Strategy?