Category: US/Russia Relationship

Saturday Soother – December 24, 2022

The Daily Escape:

Santas on the Grand Canal in Venice 2017 photo via WSJ

(This column is late coming to you since the big storm left the Mansion of Wrong with no internet for two days, due to a large tree falling across our road. The high winds prevented crews from working to remove it for 24 hours. It also may be Wrongo’s last column until Jan. 4th.)

The New Year will continue to bring us the chaos that we’ve sadly become accustomed to. The 118th Congress and its Republican House majority will again test America’s norms. The 2024 presidential election is going to bring an extra silly season of political news, so take a real break if you can.

One thought for year end is to set out a framework for thinking about America’s commitment to Ukraine.

We know that a significant number of Republicans and some Democrats want to pull the plug on our support for Ukraine in its war with Russia. For now, the majority think it should remain a “whatever it takes, for as long as it takes” situation. Implicit in the second viewpoint is that American soldiers are never going to be combatants in Ukraine, and that we’re not talking about another 20-year war like in Afghanistan.

A few things to think about. Do we have a choice to support Ukraine, or is supporting them a necessity? We have talked about the difference between “wars of choice” and “wars of necessity” throughout Wrongo’s adult life. Two of our worst military experiences were in wars of choice: Vietnam and Afghanistan. We didn’t have to intervene in either, but our political leaders decided that America’s national security had a true connection to both conflicts. The clear wars of necessity for America were the US Civil War, and the two World Wars. All threated the existence of the US homeland.

Somewhere in between wars of choice and necessity is Ukraine. It isn’t an ally where we are obligated by a treaty, like we have with Europe via NATO. We are obligated to defend any NATO member who is attacked. For example, that would mean a war against Latvia is a war against the US.

We spent 20+ years fighting in Afghanistan. Given what we learned there, would America ever spend a minute fighting for Latvia? When Trump was president he flirted with saying we wouldn’t immediately commit to defending just any NATO country, and he wasn’t alone in that thinking.

That means we could consider choosing not to defend NATO at all, or not to defend individual NATO countries.

We’re facing Cold War II with China and Russia. Our new Omnibus budget allocates 10% more money to national defense than last year, largely because of the possibility of fighting both countries at great distances from home. The budget implies that our national security is threated by both of them.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could become a generation-long rolling war between Russia and the small NATO countries that border either Russia or Belarus, if Ukraine loses. Would America then rally and support NATO? Where would we draw the red line? Support for Germany but not for Poland? Ok, we’ll support Poland, but not Latvia?

We need to think through our priorities. We fought in Afghanistan because we believed fighting a far enemy (al-Qaeda) was better than waiting and fighting them as a near enemy. That is also the basis of why we created and remain a member of NATO: Fighting Russia over there was smarter than fighting it nearby, like in Cuba.

Neither China nor Russia are presently our near enemies. If China invades Taiwan, direct involvement by the US would be another war of choice with a far enemy. Ukraine represents a war of choice with a different far enemy, but one in very close proximity to our treaty partners, an enemy that could cross NATO’s trip wire at any time.

Our history suggests that the American people will agree to wage wars of choice if they are relatively cheap and short in duration. What we call a cheap war is mostly a partisan political question. But talking about the cost of a war of choice is a proxy for how Americans value the country that we’re intent on supporting.

Ukraine is a proxy war of choice. We have very few people on the ground and none in a direct combat role. The twin goals are to preserve Ukrainian independence and to bleed Russia of its conventional military capability. Americans need to consider the following implications for national security:

  • Since our resources are limited, should we choose between containing Russia or containing China?
  • What is the goal of containing either or both?
  • How important are the small NATO counties to our national security?
  • If Ukraine loses its fight with Russia, would our national security be weakened?
  • If yes, can we live with that, or should we be doing more now?

On to a Saturday that’s also Christmas Eve! Forget tree-trimming and the last-minute Amazon shopping for a few minutes. It’s time to unplug and land on a small oasis of soothing in the midst of all of the chaos.

Gaze out at the last few leaves on the trees, and listen to the late Greg Lake, of Emerson, Lake, and Palmer, perform 1985’s “I Believe in Father Christmas”. Although most people think of it as a Christmas song, Lake wrote the song to protest the commercialization of Christmas. Here Lake, along with Jethro Tull’s Ian Anderson on flute perform it live at St. Bride’s Church, in the City of London along with the church’s choir:

The last line of the song says: “The Christmas you deserve is the Christmas you get.”

That might be considered harsh in some circumstances, but it might also be true. Anyway, Merry Christmas, Happy Festivus, Happy Chanukah, Happy Kwanzaa, and Happy New Year to all. Let’s hope the deep divisions in our country can be somehow healed by a seasonal miracle.

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Monday Wake Up Call – December 19, 2022

The Daily Escape:

Skiing Santas at Sunday River Ski Resort, Newry, ME – Dec. 11, 202, AP Photo/Robert F. Bukat

(As we cruise towards Christmas, each day this week we will feature pictures of Santas and/or Christmas trees, along with loopy songs vaguely representative of the season. You’ve been warned.)

The war in Ukraine has once again reminded policy makers of the importance logistics plays in winning on the battlefield. In reading a Defense One post by Marcus Weisgerber, Wrongo learned that demand for weapons by Ukraine — combined with worker shortages, inflation, and other factors — has made it more difficult and more expensive to produce the most in-demand weapons. This describes the current problem:

“The US has sent 13 years’ worth of Stinger production and five years’ worth of Javelin production to Ukraine…”

That’s in 10 months. And a newsletter by CDR Salamander states the overall problem clearly:

“The Ukrainians would have run out of weapons and ammunition months ago if the former Warsaw Pact nations in NATO didn’t empty what inventory they had left of Soviet Era weaponry and the rest of NATO led by the USA didn’t wander the world trying to soak up as much available inventory money could buy. That and the rapid adoption of NATO compatible equipment by the Ukrainians is helping, but that has revealed other problems – who says the West has enough to give?”

It is said that amateur warriors deal in tactics while professional soldiers deal in logistics. Both sides in this war are burning through their weapons stockpiles at unsustainable rates even though the war seems (at least momentarily) to be a stalemate. The US and NATO had little in stockpiled weapons even before the Russo-Ukrainian War, able to mount only a very limited or short war as they did (poorly) in Libya. This has been true for the past 20 years. Now those limitations are out in the open.

US defense spending could rise 10% percent in 2023. A good chunk of the increase is meant to rush weapons to Ukrainian forces fighting the Russian invasion, along with replenishing the US missiles, artillery and other weapons sent to Ukraine.

But the sad truth is that it isn’t clear that US or European defense companies, along with the thousands of small businesses that supply them, can meet this increased demand. There are plenty of reasons, including worker shortages and supply-chain disruptions that have been exacerbated by the pandemic and the global current economic outlook.

And the Pentagon was slow to award contracts to rebuild weapon stockpiles. Those that were awarded quickly had to be fast-tracked by top-level Biden administration officials. And it gets worse. Many defense firms are short-staffed relative to what’s needed to fulfill anticipated Pentagon orders to replace weapons sent to Ukraine. Defense One quotes Raytheon Technologies CEO Greg Hayes:

“The real question is, can we actually build it?….They can appropriate all the money, but…if we take months and months and months to get on contract, that’s months and months of delay.”

Raytheon builds the Stingers that are so depleted.  They are willing to ramp up, but it takes investment and lead time to grow production. More from Hayes:

“We want to be prepared to meet the demand that’s out there….I wish I could snap my fingers and then all of a sudden miraculously, throw a building up and train 500 people [to build them], but it just takes time.”

American business calls this “Lean Manufacturing“.

A final illustration of how a simple part that gets caught in the supply chain becomes a big problem: The Eurasian Times reports that German ammunition manufacturers have warned about delays in receiving cotton linters. They are a necessary component for propelling charges from small guns and artillery. All European ammunition producers depend on China for cotton linters, even though it is a commodity produced and traded globally. The time to get them to Europe has tripled to nine months.

Much like we learned during the height of the pandemic, our supply chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Lean Manufacturing and “Just-in-Time” supply chains drove the prices of imported goods through the roof, but increased demand meant that we still had to wait months to get what we ordered. Have we learned anything?

Like during the pandemic, the Russo-Ukrainian War is sending a clear warning to everyone throughout the West: We need to ramp up production, capacity, and have a more reliable – if somewhat less efficient, supply chain to support our military. This is a hard lesson, because unlike jets, missiles and ships, ammunition and expendables are hidden away in bunkers. And if your governments and diplomats do their job, they will never be used.

However, if/when you need them, like right now, the need is existential. Time to wake up America! We can’t depend on capitalism only to solve our supply chain problems. To help you wake up, take a moment to watch the Foo Fighters, who closed 2017’s Christmas episode of Saturday Night Live with an extended performance of “Everlong” that morphs into a pair of seasonal classics:

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Sunday Cartoon Blogging – December 11, 2022

Wrongo subscribes to John Dick’s, CEO of Civic Science, weekly newsletter. Last week Civic Science was first up with an opinion poll on the Brittney Griner prisoner swap. Turns out America wasn’t happy with it:

“Fifty-two percent of Americans disagreed with the decision, compared to just 37% who agreed (11% had no opinion, somehow)…..Political affiliation was highly correlated, with strong Rs opposing the move at 82% and strong Dems supporting it at 72%. Folks in the middle were anything but balanced, however, where 53% of moderates rejected the swap, while just 33% celebrated it.”

They sampled 1,876 American adults:

It’s a conundrum to Wrongo why 52% of Americans think it’s a bad decision. Would people rather we walked away from any deal just to keep Viktor Bout in jail and leave Brittney Griner in a Russian penal colony? Not wanting to let Bout go before his sentence was completed is understandable. What’s not understandable is whatever happened to American compassion and empathy? On to cartoons, although there isn’t much to laugh at here.

Why so hypocritical?

Trump delivered for Dems:

Mitch and Chuck agree:

Hershel Walker and another guy who needs a walker:

Kyrsten enters the game:

Trump’s business is a tax fraud, but he’s still taxing:

 

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Griner Comes Home

The Daily Escape:

Barn before a storm, Walla Walla, WA – 2022 photo by Gary Hamburgh Photography

After 10 months in Russian custody, including time in a penal colony, WNBA star Brittney Griner is on her way home. In exchange for Griner’s freedom, Russia secured the release of Viktor Bout, a convicted Russian arms smuggler. Another American, the former Marine Paul Whelan, remains imprisoned in Russia.

CNN reports that the White House said Griner was released to US officials. From Biden:

“Moments ago I spoke to Brittney Griner…She is safe. She is on a plane. She is on her way home.”

The prisoner swap occurred in Abu Dhabi on Thursday. A joint statement from the UAE and Saudi Arabia said both Gulf countries played a role mediating the exchange between the US and Russia. By the time you are reading this, Griner should be on American soil.

But the result is a mixed bag. It’s very good news that Griner is free. But Viktor Bout is also free to rebuild his arms-dealing network. People are rightly wondering why Whelan wasn’t included in the trade. After all, he’s finishing his fifth year in Russian prison. But negotiation requires both sides to agree and the Russians would only offer Griner.

Of course, the Right-wing chattering class disapproved. First, from House GOP Leader Kevin McCarthy, who tweeted:

“This is a gift to Vladimir Putin, and it endangers American lives….Leaving Paul Whelan behind for this is unconscionable.”

Some Conservative mouth-breather named Jessie Kelly tweeted this:

“She’s a black lesbian who hates America. Biden is just bringing another voter back home.”

Another mouth-breather, Conservative Benny Johnson who has a show on Newsmax, tweeted this with typical Right-wing understatement:

“This is the lowest point in US foreign policy in my lifetime. Collapse of an empire.”

It can’t be a long life for young Benny. What is he, five years old?

You have to love the comments by these wingnuts each of whom say they could have brokered a better deal with their expert negotiating skills. And rather than be happy that one American is returning home, they use their oral flatulence to make comments about what should have happened, and why Biden is a loser.

Poor Paul Whelan’s family shows that most Americans still have decency and class:

“NEW from the Whelan family: “There is no greater success than for a wrongful detainee to be freed & for them to go home. The Biden Admin made the right decision to bring Ms. Griner home, & to make the deal that was possible, rather than waiting for one that wasn’t going to…”

The American people should thank Paul Whelan’s brother David for being so gracious. That isn’t something that we can say about the many Republican mouthpieces who felt it was necessary to weigh in.

People need to stop thinking about this as a trade or a prisoner exchange. The Russians kidnapped Griner and held her for ransom. She was a wonderful target, being a very tall black lesbian woman playing professional basketball in Russia. She was chosen, then convicted, and then sent to the gulag for the very purpose of being bait to spring Viktor Bout.

Does it suck that the price of releasing her was letting an odious killer go free? Of course. It shouldn’t be lost on anyone that as individuals and given their relative “crimes”, they weren’t equivalent assets. Everyone knows that Griner’s offense was simply a pretext to create a prisoner that could be traded. The initial arrest was about finding a small amount of hash oil on a Black gay woman.

Prisoner exchanges usually look like, “You arrested one of our spies and we want him back, so we arrested one of your spies. Let’s talk.” They don’t normally look like: “We plucked a random minor celebrity of yours off the street and she’s gonna do nine years.”

And when they do, it’s important to point out that it’s more like a kidnapping and a ransom than it is like an equivalent exchange.

Two closing thoughts. First, Conservatives always say: “Don’t negotiate with terrorists“. But all nations negotiate with terrorists; that’s just something governments say. Negotiating with terrorists doesn’t incentivize terrorism. It incentivizes terrorists to negotiate. The alternative is that terrorists engage in terrorism that does not involve negotiations. And that only leads to terrible outcomes.

All governments have to decide whether to negotiate or not on a case by case basis.

Second, Americans, especially conspicuous Americans, should stay the hell out of Russia until the Putin government’s current business plan is updated.

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Russia’s New Ukraine Strategy

The Daily Escape:

Dune Evening Primrose, Anza Borrego Desert SP, CA – November 2022 photo by Paulette Donnellon. This flower only blooms at night.

The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase. Early predictions that Russian forces would roll over token Ukrainian resistance didn’t last long. Confidence grew in a possible Ukrainian victory after Kyiv took advantage of America’s HIMARS artillery and other highly capable Western equipment began to degrade the Russian logistics and command systems.

Then, Ukraine launched a series of counter-offensives that have liberated formerly Russian occupied territory. November’s evacuation of Kherson by Russia showed that Moscow hasn’t yet found a way to stabilize its front lines in the face of Ukrainian military ground tactics.

But the ground has now shifted. The newest Russian commander, General Sergei Surovikin, in October began a bombing campaign on Ukrainian utilities throughout the country. It soon became clear that Russia is attempting to take out as much of Ukraine’s electrical grid as it can.

The WaPo said in late October:

“Russia’s ongoing attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have been so methodical and destructive that administration officials say they are being led by power experts who know exactly which targets will cause the most damage to Ukraine’s power grid.”

Tactically, Ukraine’s weapons and ammunition can be replaced by the west. Troops can be trained to use new systems; cash can be transferred from Washington and/or Brussels. But the electric grid infrastructure cannot be easily fixed with replacements or money. There isn’t a large inventory of Soviet-era power generating and transmission gear laying around Europe that can be marshaled to fix the Ukrainian grid.

The grid destruction is taking place primarily by precision missile strikes launched from aircraft flying within Russia. We’ve seen that Russia continues to struggle in the land battle, but they have much more latitude to strike against Ukraine’s society and economy from within their own country.

We may have to refine our viewpoint about who is winning and losing this war. The US and NATO have focused on the land battle, which now favors Ukraine. But Russia seems willing to use air bombing to grind western Ukraine into a wasteland. The precision bombing of infrastructure can go on all winter, while the movement of ground forces will largely come to a halt as winter deepens.

Russia could make western Ukraine so close to uninhabitable that many of its citizens leave for Europe. No electric power in western Ukraine also means no water. That would mean the only people who could continue to live there would be the hardiest.

Russia can do all of this while the ground war is literally frozen in place. Russia can do this without a major commitment of additional troops, tanks, or new logistics paths into Ukraine.

If this is Russia’s plan, it makes sense. It’s incremental, has flexibility and fully utilizes Russia’s current advantages, including control of its own airspace. And since NATO and the US haven’t supplied Ukraine with weapons that could reach Russian soil or airspace, Russians are invulnerable to sustained Ukrainian attack.

Russia isn’t acquiring and defending new territory; it’s degrading much of Ukraine instead. Whether this is a winning strategy or not, it’s evidence of new and higher quality military thinking on Russia’s part.

It isn’t necessarily a winning strategy if the west supplies Ukraine with better air defense weaponry or with weapons that have the range to reach into Russia. There are two types of weapons to consider. Those that have a range that could strike behind Russian lines, and those that could reach into Russia itself.

Longer-range weapons raise concerns that the conflict could escalate to include NATO. But at the currently underway Bucharest NATO meeting, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis said  that Ukraine should be free to strike military sites inside Russia as it fends off attacks on its critical infrastructure. Washington has previously denied Kyiv’s request for the 185-mile range ATACMS missile, which can reach into Russia.

America is at a similar point in the Ukraine war to where it was in the Afghan war: The enemy is striking it from another country, and our policy is not to pursue them inside their political borders.

The difference is that America was doing the fighting in Afghanistan and Ukraine is doing the fighting inside Ukraine. But in both cases, the US policy is strategically flawed. Russia must be made to pay real costs if they are going to use stand-off weapons to grind Ukraine into dust.

The challenge for NATO’s and America’s generals is to recognize that the Russian war strategy has changed, and to adapt to it. Russia wants to make it into a war of attrition. Ukraine wants to retake its lands.

How should Biden and NATO respond? Can the West sustain Ukraine in a prolonged existential conflict like this without changing its strategy?

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Saturday Soother, Nordstream Clues Edition – October 1, 2022

The Daily Escape:

Sunrise, Kalalau Valley Lookout, Waimea Canyon, Kauai, HI – September 2022 photo by Alex Skoz

Who sabotaged the Nordstream pipelines? We’re forced to speculate, but it’s a near certainty that the US Navy knows who did it. In perusing Stratfor’s publication this week of where in the world US Navy fleets are located, Wrongo saw this map:

The map breaks the Navy’s fleets into Carrier groups (four in orange) and LHA and LHD Amphibious Assault groups (two in blue). The map shows the location of these groups over the last four weeks. The one of interest is LHD3. It spent most of the past four weeks in the Baltic Sea, including a great deal of time very near the Nordstream pipelines.

LHD3 is the designation of the USS Kearsarge, what the Navy calls a Multiple Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship, shorthand for a small aircraft carrier. The Kearsarge left the Baltic Sea a few days ago. Part of the reason the Kearsarge was in the Baltic was to participate in Baltops 22:

“This year, more than 45 ships, over 75 aircraft, and 7,000 personnel are tasked to execute a series of complex events throughout the two-week exercise.”

Seapower Magazine reported that one element of the Kearsarge operations in the Baltic was to test special sub-sea mine destruction technologies: (emphasis by Wrongo)

“A significant focus of BALTOPS every year is the demonstration of NATO mine hunting capabilities, and this year the US Navy continues to use the exercise as an opportunity to test emerging technology….Experimentation was conducted off the coast of Bornholm, Denmark….”

Bornholm is where the first breaches of Nordstream Two were discovered. Stratfor reports that:

“On Sept. 26, the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Administration warned of potential ”deliberate attacks” after energy companies reported multiple cases of unidentified drones flying near offshore oil and gas installations. Just a few hours later, officials in Denmark warned they had found a gas leak along a section of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline off the coast of the Danish island of Bornholm.”

The following day, the Swedish Maritime Administration announced it also detected two gas leaks on the Nordstream One pipeline in a nearby area. A fourth leak was discovered subsequently. While the Baltops 22 operation finished in July, the US Sixth Fleet didn’t begin leaving the Baltic Sea until September 22.

So it’s highly likely the Navy knows what happened and maybe who did it.

A head-scratching question is why would anyone do this? Damaging Nordstream is a direct terror attack on both Russia, and the EU, Germany, and the western European nations indirectly connected to the pipelines.

It is impossible to believe that it was done undetected. This type of clandestine operation requires deep water explosives, submersibles, divers and digging through the sea mud to attach explosives to the concrete shell that surrounds the steel pipeline.

Let’s take a brief look at the leading characters. Western governments say Russia did it, but why would it? One benefit to the Russians is that it forced the price of natural gas even higher (it went up 7%). It might have propaganda value; Russia can blame the US and thereby further turn Russian civilians against the West.

One old myth may apply: According to legend, Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés ordered his men to “Burn the boats” as they began their conquest of the Aztec empire in 1519. The idea was that there would be no opportunity to retreat, and winning the battle was all that mattered. For Putin, could it be he purposefully destroyed billions of dollars of Russian energy infrastructure and their “cash cow”, believing that Europe will never again want Russian gas? If so, that means Putin intends to win WWIII.

Could it be China? Closing Nordstream means China would get all the gas it needs, and possibly at even cheaper prices. Rendering Nordstream useless forces the Russians to tie their currency more tightly to the Chinese Yuan. And the newest Chinese submarines might be able to do the deed.

Could it be the US? We have the technology and were in the area. But what goal of our foreign policy would be served by drastically hurting our NATO allies? If we did it, we’ve gone from a passive participant arming Ukraine to an active participant, possibly engaging in an Act of War.

Could it be a smaller state in the rabid anti-Russian west such as Poland?  The US Navy knows. Will they tell anyone?

On to the weekend, where we ignore what Gini Thomas told the Jan. 6 Committee or, whatever Judge Aileen Cannon is thinking about Trump’s documents. It’s time for our Saturday Soother! Start by brewing up a hot steaming mug of Kahiko ($47.95 for 8oz: expensive, no? Thanks Biden) from Hawaii’s Hula Daddy Kona Coffee. It is said to be richly chocolaty, harmoniously juicy, and bright.

Now, grab a seat by a south-facing window and listen to George Gershwin’s “Lullaby for Strings”, written in 1919, although it was first performed as an orchestral piece in 1967. It’s played here by the New York Philharmonic String Quartet in 2016:

BTW: Stop watching cable news.

 

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Is Putin Bluffing?

The Daily Escape:

Sunset, foothills of the Superstition Mountains, Phoenix, AZ – September 2022 photo by Gary Robinson

Wrongo is a life-long peacenik. That started with his opposition to the Vietnam War, which didn’t prevent him from being drafted and spending his service time in Germany running a nuclear missile site for the US Army. His anti-war stance went forward through Grenada, Iraq (twice), Libya, Syria and of course, Afghanistan.

Curiously, he’s in favor of the US assisting Ukraine, largely because if Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is unchecked, it will create a continuing threat to Europe and to world peace. The fallout from NATO assisting Ukraine to date has been immense. Now, Russia appears to be trying to add holding Europe hostage to a nuclear threat to his already holding it hostage for energy.

In a speech Wednesday morning, Putin announced a partial mobilization of his military, saying the goals of his invasion of Ukraine had not changed and that the step was “necessary and urgent,” and effective immediately. They’re going to mobilize 300,000 troops who have prior military experience.

Contrast this to the 200,000 troops he used to invade Ukraine.

This is Russia’s reaction first, to getting bogged down in what was supposed to be a quick operation in Ukraine; and second, by Ukraine’s successful counter-offensive that has caused a significant Russian military retreat.

Russia’s plan is now to absorb the Donbas region into Russia after a sham referendum in the next few days. Once Russia annexes the Donbas, Putin says that part of Ukraine will henceforth be a part of Russia. He made his strategy explicit:

“If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will certainly use all the means at our disposal to protect Russia and our people….This is not a bluff.”

From a Russian perspective, any further Ukrainian attacks in the Donbas could be construed as attacks on Russia. That means Russia might consider themselves free to interdict NATO resupply operations to Ukraine even within NATO countries.

We’re now in a situation that’s fast-moving, and potentially dangerous. Putin is reminding the West that he has his finger on the nuclear button. He also said:

“I want to remind you that our country also has various means of destruction, and some components are more modern than those of the NATO countries…”

Even though Putin said he isn’t bluffing, we have to ask: Is this a bluff?

The answer may turn on whether we’re talking about Russia attacking the West outside of Ukraine, and whether they use nukes or conventional weapons in that attack. If they use nukes, the question is whether they use tactical nukes (usually 2-200 kilotons) or heavy ballistic missiles. The Hiroshima bomb was 15 kt. The US has deployed about 100 tactical nuclear bombs, called the B61, in Italy, Germany, Turkey, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Russia going nuclear would confront NATO with two unpalatable choices: One, back down and accede to Russian demands with the near certainty of having to face additional attempts at nuclear blackmail farther down the road. The other option would be for NATO to hit back with its own nuclear arsenal with the obvious risk of having the Ukrainian War escalate into a general nuclear war.

A third possibility is for NATO to retaliate with a large conventional weapon strike. If NATO wants maximum shock value for their nonnuclear counterstroke, striking Crimea would be a serious response.

But whether there is a conventional or nuclear response, the possibility of escalation seems high. OTOH, if Putin used a tactical nuke in Ukraine, it could signal the start of the end game for him. Even the most opportunistic of Russia’s allies would cut them off, both diplomatically and economically.

But the problem with playing chicken is that sometimes the other guy just holds the wheel straight, presses the accelerator, and closes his eyes.

What counters this is that the people surrounding Putin have as much to lose as anyone in the West in the event of an escalation that brings NATO into the fray. Will Putin actually resort to using nukes in Ukraine or Europe? Nobody knows.

Putin knows that everyone knows he knows that he can’t actually win using nukes. The threat is that he will tip the geopolitical board over in a tantrum. Putin’s actual use of nukes will result in a tremendous blowback of either retaliatory nuclear strikes or large-scale conventional weapons strikes, depending on how he actually used his nukes.

Something to consider is speed of response. Putin can nuke Ukraine with a transit time of around 8 minutes from launch to detonation for a ballistic missile, and slightly longer for a cruise missile. Rest assured that the US/NATO have some nuclear-armed submarines in the Arctic that could hit Moscow in 8-10 minutes if it came to that.

Sitting in the comfort of the US, Wrongo can’t support adopting a Chamberlain-esque policy of appeasement with Russia.

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Ukraine Update

The Daily Escape:

Cowee Mountain Overlook, Blue Ridge Mountains, NC – 2022 photo by Jordan Hill Photography

The Washington Examiner posted this shocking number:

“More than 50,000 Russian service members have been killed in the more than six months since the war in Ukraine began.”

They are quoting from a tweet by the Ukraine Ministry of Defence that says 50,150 Russian soldiers have been killed. That doesn’t mean that the figure is accurate, but it’s a stake in the ground by Ukraine.

A separate tweet by someone who is difficult to verify, translates what purports to be a document from the Russian Ministry of Finance. It provides some backup to the claim of deaths, assuming it’s both accurately translated and authentic: (Brackets by Wrongo)

“The doc[ument] from the Russian Ministry of Finance, which is distributed online, says that as of Aug 28, the families of the dead soldiers were paid 361.4 bill[ion] rubles, 7.4 mill[ion] for each [soldier]. The division would give 48,838 CONFIRMED deaths. This does NOT include those LDNR”

LDNR is an abbreviation for the breakaway Ukrainian provinces under Russian control. This comes a month after a senior Pentagon official said it believes that roughly 70,000-80,000 Russian forces have been killed or wounded in action.

If the number of deaths was correct, one would expect the number of wounded to be substantially higher than the Pentagon estimate, assuming the 50,000 was subtracted from the 80,000 number.

Even if these numbers are exaggerated, and the reality is more like half the number of deaths vs. what Ukraine has reported, few governments can survive losing ~25,000 troops in six months in what amounts to a war of choice.

By contrast, the US lost 2, 456 military in the 20-year Afghan War, while the Soviet Union lost 13, 310 in its 10 years there.

Meanwhile CNN is reporting on Russian President Putin’s combative speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in the Russian Pacific city of Vladivostok, where he claimed that Russia is gaining influence on the global stage. This from a transcript posted on the Kremlin website:

“We have not lost anything and will not lose anything….the entire system of international relations has recently undergone irreversible…tectonic shifts,”

It makes Wrongo wonder if the families of the reported 50,000 Russian soldiers killed feel the same way.

Further, there have been several reports in Western media that support Putin’s claims that the sanctions aren’t really that successful. Western countries are trying to cripple Russia’s $1.8 trillion economy, and the effectiveness of our sanctions is a key ingredient in the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

The Economist reports that the sanctions are not going as well as expected, and Russia’s GDP will shrink by 6% in 2022. But Bloomberg, citing information from planners inside the Kremlin, says that the Kremlin planners’ base case sees the economy bottoming out next year at 8.3% below the 2021 level. That would be a severe economic impact, felt in all corners of the Russian Federation.

On top of that, if Putin carries through on his threat this week to cut off all natural gas exports to Europe, that could cost as much as 400 billion rubles ($6.6 billion) a year in lost tax revenues. And Putin’s touted new export markets wouldn’t fully compensate for the lost European sales, even over the next 3-5 years.

Sanctions won’t win the war. They are having the effect of weakening Russia, when what they thought would be a short war with acceptable costs has turned into a long war with costs that are potentially dangerous.

The high human death toll coupled with the burgeoning economic costs may mean sadder times in Moscow.

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Russia, Iran Form Energy Cartel

The Daily Escape:

Sunset, Lookout Point, Harpswell, ME – August 2022 photo by Rick Berk Photography

Good strategy is supposed to include a look at what the logical outcomes may be, once you’ve implemented your strategic plan. Was that done when the US and the EU decided to sanction Russia about its Ukraine invasion after having sanctioned Iran, well, for being Iran?

When you treat much of the world as your enemy, you should expect them to eventually find common cause and fight back. We’re speaking about the world’s supply of natural gas (NatGas). There is a new alliance between Russia and Iran on NatGas. At Oil Price, Simon Watkins says that a new energy cartel is forming: (brackets and emphasis by Wrongo)

“The US $40 billion memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed last month between [Russia’s] Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) is a steppingstone to enabling Russia and Iran to implement their long-held plan to be the core participants in a global cartel for gas suppliers in the same mold as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for oil suppliers.”

The article describes how Russia and Iran are creating a NatGas OPEC. The two countries are first and second respectively in holding the world’s largest NatGas reserves. Russia has just under 48 trillion cubic meters (tcm) and Iran has nearly 34 tcm, so the two countries are in an ideal position to form a cartel.

NatGas is a vital commodity. It is widely seen as the optimal product in the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. And controlling the global flow of it will be the key to energy-based power over the next 10 to 20 years. This has already been demonstrated in Russia’s hold over the EU through its NatGas supplies.

From a top-down perspective, this Russia-Iran alliance might also draw other Middle East gas producers, who have tried to be neutral between the Russia-Iran-China axis or the US-EU-Japan axis.

Qatar has long been seen by Russia and Iran as a prime candidate for this kind of gas cartel because it shares its gas field with Iran. Iran has exclusive rights over 3,700 sq.km of the well-known South Pars field (containing around 14 tcm of gas), with Qatar’s North Field comprising the remaining 6,000 sq.km (and 37 tcm of gas).

If they can enlist Qatar, this new cartel would control 60% of world gas reserves, allowing them to control NatGas prices globally. It would be logical for prices to rise, given the growing demand for NatGas in the coming decades.

America can dodge this bullet for a few years because proven gas reserves in the US amount to about 13.5 tcm. So, at the current level of production we can produce sufficient NatGas for another 13-15 years.

But this means that in a decade or so, the US, Europe, and Asia will all be more dependent on imports from Russia, Iran, and Qatar, while competing with the rest of the world for our share in order to maintain our economy and lifestyle.

So, strategy can be a bitch. By creating a global political and economic environment that pushes Russia, Iran, and Qatar into a cartel, we’ve created a significant future economic vulnerability.

There are immediate NatGas cost implications in the US today. Bloomberg’s article, A ‘Tsunami of Shutoffs’: 20 Million US Homes Are Behind on Energy Bills, paints a picture:

“…about 1 in 6 American homes…have fallen behind on their utility bills. It is, according to the National Energy Assistance Directors Association (NEADA), the worst crisis the group has ever documented. Underpinning those numbers is a…surge in electricity prices, propelled by the soaring cost of natural gas.”

That’s 16% of American homes for the math challenged. Winter in the US may not be as big a disaster as in the UK and Europe, (better insulation). But plenty of people here will have to choose between food and heat.

The world is sorting itself out into blocks of countries aligned with each other. Russia, China, Iran and perhaps India, want their own commodity-based financial system to reduce their exposure to the political impacts from the West’s corporate/state “free” market system, which has used trade as a weapon for the past few decades.

There are two ways of looking at this. We could just build this energy vulnerability into our economic planning and prepare to devote a growing share of our GDP to paying the cartel for more NatGas.

Or, we could immediately start seriously building out our renewable energy capacity. There’s a model. Europe is attempting to pivot away as quickly as possible from its dependence on Russia.

We could do the same thing.

That could reduce our exposure to imported NatGas because it’s largely a bridge from coal to renewables. Massive investing in renewables would give Russia and Iran a shorter bridge than they think they’re getting.

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The US Jobs Market and The EU vs. Russia

The Daily Escape:

Sunset, Lake Sammamish, Issaquah, WA – June 2022 photo by Gary Hamburgh

Two pieces of news to think about today.

First, you can always tell when an economic boom is nearing its end, because the jobs market begins to get shaky. That seems to be starting. The WSJ reports that:

“Businesses in several different industries are rescinding job offers they made just a few months ago, in a sign the tightest labor market in decades may be showing cracks.”

No need to panic just yet, the labor market remains strong, with an unemployment rate at 3.6%, near a half-century low. But signs of retrenchment in hiring shows that executives are having trouble predicting the economy over the next 12 months.

And when companies revoke job offers, it indicates their view of the future business outlook has changed so quickly that it’s undoing hiring plans made only a few weeks before.

Many hiring managers say signing up new recruits remains highly competitive. The WSJ reports on a Gartner survey of more than 350 HR executives conducted in May that found around 50% thought the competition for talent would increase over the next six months. Nearly two-thirds said they hadn’t made any changes to their hiring practices or HR budgets in response to economic volatility.

But it seems there are changes afoot. Country wisdom says that a storm rarely hits us without warning. The skies turn dark, the wind picks up, the birds go quiet. It’s possible to see the signs before the storm hits if you know what to look for. We’re seeing signs now of what’s to come.

Second, there’s an adage, attributed to Trotsky, but difficult to verify, that says: “You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.” Those words are apt in today’s situation between Europe and Russia. CNN is reporting about an emerging flashpoint between Russia and the EU:

“Tensions are mounting around…the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, an isolated but strategically significant territory on the Baltic coast…Russia has reacted furiously after Lithuania banned the passage of sanctioned goods…into Kaliningrad. But Lithuania says it is merely upholding European Union sanctions, and the European bloc has backed it.”

Kaliningrad is Russia’s westernmost territory and it has no land connection to Russia. It’s the only part of Russia that is completely surrounded by EU states. Here’s a map:

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are all members of NATO, surrounding Kaliningrad militarily. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, experts have feared that Kaliningrad might become the next flashpoint in tensions between Moscow and Europe.

Russia says that Lithuania’s sanctions on goods transit is a blockade in violation of a 2002 agreement to allow goods to flow between Kaliningrad and Russia. Sanctions apply to about 50% of Russian shipments. The sanctioned products include construction machinery, machine tools and other industrial equipment. But food and personal travel are not sanctioned.

Since the Baltic freezes during the winter, resupplying Kaliningrad will become particularly difficult in about six months. Lithuania has also closed its airspace to Russia. A Berlin-style airlift could prove problematic as well.

Lithuania has spent years building a liquid natural gas (LNG) port and the infrastructure necessary to connect to Nordic and EU grids. She was therefore able to shut off Russian oil, gas, and coal quickly and is in a better position to do without Russia’s gas than the rest of the EU.

Lithuania imports 70% of its electricity from Sweden through a dedicated underwater cable. Sweden’s power is nuclear and hydroelectric, thus independent of Russia as well. Lithuania is also in a position to supply gas to Latvia, Estonia, and Poland through their LNG terminal.

So is Europe at a flashpoint? There’s little Moscow can do to Lithuania beyond threaten.

Is it just a matter of time before NATO and Russia are in a shooting war? Doubtful. Russia could try cutting off all oil, gas, and coal exports to the other NATO countries. Russia could then say they would sell to any countries that left NATO. That might not pop NATO’s balloon, but it might take some of the air out of it.

If Russia decided to do that, it would have to find a way to transport it’s oil, gas, and coal to alternate customers. That can’t happen quickly. Given that the adversarial relationship between Europe and Russia may last a decade or more, Russia will probably have to find alternative customers regardless.

Neither side wants to undertake drastic changes in energy supply too precipitously.

Wrongo doubts the Kaliningrad situation will lead to war, but each provocation and escalation increases the odds. We’re playing in a very high stakes game, given the nuclear weapons on all sides. But Europe and NATO can’t automatically bow to Russia’s threats.

NATO can’t be unwilling to fight, but there’s a difference between that and provoking a war. Right now, it’s difficult to see a peaceful end game between the US, NATO, and Russia

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