Tag: Defense Contractors

Ukraine War Reveals Our Broken Military Supply Chain

The Daily Escape:

Archangel Falls, Zion NP, UT – August 2023 photo by Torsten Hartmann Photography

The most important thing we’ve learned from the Ukraine War is that the US isn’t ready for a protracted war. One of the big reasons why, as The Insider says, America no longer builds weapons the way it used to. And we need to start building weapons again at tempo.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has drawn a similar conclusion about US weapons manufacturing: There is no surge capacity and it will take years to revive it. According to their study, replacing the inventory of the critical items used in Ukraine, like 155 millimeter artillery shells, will take 4-7 years; Javelin missiles will take 8 years to replace; Stinger missiles 18 years. Before the Ukraine War broke out, the US was producing only about 14,000 155mm shells per year, enough for two days of fighting in Ukraine at current usage rates.

This scramble for ammunition reflects how ill-prepared the US and its allies are to sustain an intense and/or protracted land war.

Think back to America’s weapons building capabilities during World War II. We became an industrial powerhouse, cranking out warships and aircraft at a breakneck pace. One example: The Navy built ships in just weeks — its fleet grew from just 700 to over 6,000 over the course of the war.

The US maintained this capacity for decades but, as The Insider reports:

“Nowadays, it might take years to build a US Navy ship. The reasons for this are complex — shifted priorities, increased technology on board…labor costs — but the effect is clear: In a high-intensity conflict, the US would face challenges in not only producing vessels but also repairing any ships damaged in battle.”

These aren’t the only weapons that are in short supply. The Pentagon issued a study in April on the contraction of our Defense Contracting industry, which went from 52 primary contractors in the 1990s down to just six today. (full disclosure: Wrongo owns what is for him, a substantial number of shares in one of the six companies.)

During Clinton’s presidency, following the fall of the Soviet Union, Defense Secretary Bill Perry convened defense industry CEOs (known in the industry as the “last supper”) and told them that they should not assume production contracts would be maintained at Cold War levels, and they needed to diversify to survive. Many of the companies got out of defense production, and those that remained merged to secure market share of what became dwindling orders from the Pentagon.

This insured that US weapons suppliers wouldn’t be ready for a future that included China’s defense spending surge, the Russia-China strategic partnership, or today’s war in Ukraine.

Now, the Pentagon is revisiting whether industry consolidation has gone too far.

The WSJ reports that today, the industrial base of defense vendors is about 55,000 companies, down from 69,000 in 2016, and many of them are small firms. This smaller base has become a choke point as shortages of labor, chips, rocket motors and other components are stymieing efforts to boost arms production. The WSJ quotes Halimah Najieb-Locke, the Pentagon’s deputy assistant secretary of defense in charge of industrial-base issues, that the Pentagon:

“…is increasingly reliant on a smaller number of contractors for these critical capabilities….That impacts everybody’s ability to ramp production.”

These supply chain issues also dog the global arms manufacturing industry. US companies hold the first five spots in the top 10 ranking of arms sales, with China taking another four. The consolidated sales of the top five have fallen since the start of the Ukraine War.

Having this paradoxical slowdown in sales amid an increase in demand speaks to the larger challenges of a defense contractor base that is geared to peacetime production. The Defense Department has a role in this failure, since they rarely award contracts for multiyear procurements beyond current requirements. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. CQ Brown said that the military hasn’t focused enough on keeping a steady flow of munitions production and procurement:

“In some cases, because you don’t have a threat on your doorstep, munitions aren’t…high on our priority list…”

Making the age-old point that sometimes, “just in time” isn’t. More from the WSJ: (emphasis by Wrongo)

“Lockheed and second-ranked Raytheon Technologies Corp. jointly produce…Javelin antitank missiles, but they expect it will take two years to double output that is now at around 400 a month.”

More:

“Greg Hayes, chief executive at Raytheon, said that Ukraine has burned through five years of Javelin production since February and 13 years’ worth of Stinger antiaircraft missiles.”

Aerojet Rocketdyne is an example of a small but crucial cog in the defense industry. It builds the rocket motors used in the Javelin and Stinger missiles deployed in Ukraine. Labor and supplier issues have delayed its deliveries of rocket motors. Raytheon, who makes the Javelin along with Lockheed, said it will be 2024 before Aerojet catches up with engine orders.

The US is also facing a nearly $19 billion backlog in arms sales to Taiwan. Control of the Pacific would be a crucial part of any war with China, and Beijing has the world’s largest navy. According to a 2022 Pentagon report, the country has about 340 ships and submarines. The US, meanwhile, has fewer than 300 warships. Despite that, the US is committed to growing its fleet. Its number of ships is expected to increase to 350 by the 2040s.

To keep up with China, the US will need to build more ships and submarines more quickly. But it has a smaller number of shipyards and a skilled-labor shortage.

All of this will take money, billions of it. But we’re already first in the world’s defense spending. The worst military equipment is equipment that isn’t unavailable when it’s needed. That is not to say that the Defense Contractors should be given a blank check, but we are in dangerous times.

The US spends more on national defense than the next ten countries combined. Defense spending accounts for 12% of all federal spending and nearly half of US discretionary spending. The Defense Contractors are floating on a sea of profits from their captured Pentagon customer.

But is it better to spend extra dollars to have weapons inventory on hand than pay the much higher political cost of a military failure? Can those dollars be found within the existing defense budget rather than by adding to it? From a strategic viewpoint, shouldn’t we build capacity in peacetime when we don’t yet need it (while hoping never to), so that if the US does need it, the capital assets are in place?

The real issue is the stop/start government procurement process. We saw this in N95 mask sourcing, where domestic suppliers downsized over the years to a point where they couldn’t meet the surge in demand when Covid hit. After they ramped up, the government walked away from them when mask mandates ended.

This is also true in defense. Over the last 25 years, Congress has passed more than 120 Continuing Resolutions to fund the Pentagon instead of annual appropriations bills. With Continuing Resolutions comes chronic uncertainty for companies about when they’ll get paid, or when they can proceed to a new phase of weapons development or production.

Nothing is forcing the DOD to only do business with a small group of contractors (other than no one else bids on the contracts because the DOD won’t award to them). The issue is a shrinking domestic manufacturing base, and a lack of sustained business in the defense sector to support a larger field of competitors.

Market forces require efficiency. Sadly, efficiency comes at the cost of resiliency. National security priorities should deal with the stop/start issues that face our defense industry. In 2020, the National Defense Industrial Association’s report on the readiness of the Defense Industrial Base said 27% of critical defense supplier industries would likely experience shortages in the event of a surge in demand for combat-essential products.

And two years later, it happened in Ukraine.

Over the longer term, the US should develop an industrial reserve policy that pays companies to maintain excess capacity, such as warehousing critical, long lead-time parts. Much of today’s production challenges could be easily resolved by giving selected weapons or weapons systems a “protected” status, making them outside of the usual DOD acquisition and contracting rules that limit the flexibility and commitment needed to ensure a continuous production line.

This strategy would be expensive. But Russia’s war in Ukraine has reinforced the necessity of maintaining a deep inventory of weapons which we no longer have today. And it’s no longer a question of whether the US industrial base is prepared to rapidly surge production. It’s clear that we are not, because the necessary investments have not been made.

(hat tip to Brendan K. for his useful insights for this article)

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Saturday Soother – November 13, 2021

The Daily Escape:

Coral Pink Sand Dunes State Park, UT – November 2021 photo by Byron Jones

This week’s Veteran’s Day apparently isn’t finished with Wrongo just yet. It’s important to remember that when the US war in Afghanistan ended in August after nearly 20 years, there were both hard and soft costs that had been paid, and much that remains to be paid.

The Pentagon reports the hard costs of our Afghanistan adventure to be $825 billion. However, the “Costs of War” project at Brown University estimates those costs at $2.313 trillion. But it gets worse: They estimate the costs of all US post-9/11 war spending at $8 trillion, including future obligations for veterans’ care and the cost of borrowing on the associated federal debt for roughly 30 years. They also estimate the human costs of the “global war on terror” at 900,000 deaths.

Those are all truly staggering numbers.

And Congress is now considering next fiscal year’s military budget. Defense One is covering this so you don’t have to. They’re saying that the proposed 2022 defense budget will be another bipartisan effort by the old-timers in the House and Senate to add more money than was asked for into the pot. And it’s part of a long history of hiding flimsy arguments behind dramatic rhetoric: (parenthesis by Wrongo)

“This year, both the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and House Armed Services Committee (HASC) have displayed a similar unwillingness to distinguish between needs and wants in their versions of the National Defense Authorization Act, which recommend adding $25 billion and $24 billion, respectively, to President Biden’s recommended $715 billion Pentagon budget.”

More:

“It is difficult to imagine how either the SASC or HASC could convincingly demonstrate the necessity of such military spending increases when none of the most urgent crises facing the United States today have military solutions. Furthermore, the credibility of both the Pentagon and Congress on this subject is, to put it mildly, underwhelming: one has an extensive history of budgetary boondoggles, and the other is openly cozy with the U.S. arms industry.”

Defense One says that the most frustrating aspect isn’t the exorbitant amounts, but the lack of any substantive strategic justification for the increased spending by either Chamber. In specific, Defense One argues that  there’s been no effort to demonstrate that the Senate’s billions are funding needs instead of simply political wants.

Remember this is from Defense One, a stalwart defender of America’s military.

We shouldn’t assume legislators think carefully about the public’s interest when crafting the defense budget. Over the years, the defense budget process is driven partly by what the administration and the Pentagon ask for, and by what the defense industry wants for its bottom line. (Full disclosure, Wrongo holds a significant number of shares in a large defense contracting firm.)

US military spending in 2020 was $778 billion. The next closest nation was China, at $252 billion. In third place was India at $72.9 billion. Another perspective is to compare what we spent to fight in Vietnam to the costs of our Apollo moon landing. Apollo 11 got to the moon in July of 1969. That feat cost the US about $25.8 billion.

During the same era, it’s estimated that the Vietnam War cost the US $141 billion over 14 years. That means that we spent about as much in two years in Vietnam as we spent on the entire space race!

When we think about accountability for the costs of the Pentagon, we should remember that the Pentagon has never passed an outside expense audit. Waste is endemic; and the Pentagon simply fabricates numbers, but receives nearly zero pushback from Congress.

There’s so much corruption in the halls of Congress that we will never know how little we could spend on defense. Maybe we should just make some deep cuts to the defense budget and force real strategic decision-making down their throats.

Enough! It’s Saturday, and we need to take a break from trying to figure out whether Steve Bannon or Kyle Rittenhouse will ever go to jail. It’s time for our Saturday Soother.

With a soaking rain in Connecticut today, we’re limited to indoor sports. Most of our fall clean-up is still ahead, but today, let’s grab a seat by the window and listen to pianist Max Richter’s “Mercy” with Richter on piano and Mari Samuelsen on violin. Richter originally wrote the piece 10 years ago for violinist Hillary Hahn. For Richter, “Mercy” places the need for mercy and compassion firmly within our view:

 

 

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Lockheed’s F-35 Jet a Failure After 17 Years

The Daily Escape:

Cherry Blossoms in snow, Fairfax VA – March 2018 photo by Jen Johnson

Lockheed Martin‘s fifth-generation stealth fighter, the F-35, has cost $406.5 billion so far. And it still has 263 “high priority” unaddressed performance and safety deficiencies. The list of setbacks includes faulty ejection seats, software delays, weapons targeting problems, and helmet-display issues.

The program was launched in 2001. The blog, War Is Boring says:

The American people were assured the new jet would enter service in 2008 and be a high-performance replacement for the military’s aging airframes while only costing between $40 million and $50 million.

But, 17+years later, the F-35 has continuing redesign, test deficiencies, fixes, schedule slippages and cost overruns. And according to War Is Boring (WisB), it’s going into production with many still-unsolved problems:

Despite this, the F-35 Joint Program Office now intends to call—quite arbitrarily—an end to the plane’s development phase and developmental testing. Instead of completing the presently planned development work, the Program Office is now proposing to substitute a vaguely defined F-35 upgrade program called “continuous capability development and delivery.”

This means that the F-35 will begin operational testing this year, using 23 planes that still incorporate the 263 known deficiencies.

And it’s worse than it appears. The reason to build this aircraft was to combat advanced future threats by our competitor’s air forces. However, WisB reports that testing shows that the planes already delivered cannot even effectively address the current threats. That’s a problem. The ancient, battle-proven A-10 is one of the aircrafts the F-35 was designed to replace:

As of now, testing shows the F-35 is incapable of performing most of the functions required for an acceptable close support aircraft, functions the A-10 is performing daily in current combat.

More:

In the air-to-air mission, the current F-35 is similarly incapable of matching legacy aircraft like the F-15, F-16 and F-22.

So, it looks as if we have a mismanaged program that may take many additional years to turn around. Along the way, they have gotten much more expensive. CNBC reports that the cost of each aircraft has doubled:

As it stands now, the unit price for an F-35A — including aircraft, engine and fees — is $94.3 million.

So, it’s actually a worse aircraft than those it supposedly replaces, and it’s more expensive. And, we’re ordering many, many more of them. CNBC reports that the fleet will grow from 280 aircraft to 800-plus by the end of 2021.

And it seems well past the stage where the program could be cancelled, even if the Department of Defense wanted to. The plane has suppliers in all 50 states, a perfect form of political insulation from any effort to scrap the program.

If the F-35 can’t be fixed, we may see a gradual trickle of announcements about additional procurement of A-10s, F-18’s, etc., to plug the gaps. It might turn out that F-35s will be for show, or limited use only, a little like battleships in WWII.

The colossal cost for a program that doesn’t work is mind blowing – all things considered, the F-35 program will cost in the low trillions of dollars. Despite all of the effort, time, and money, it remains an open question if the F-35 will ever live up to the promises the Defense Department made years ago.

The latest annual report from the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, (DOT&E) has this summation: (brackets by WisB)

Finally and most importantly, the program will likely deliver Block 3F [the untested, allegedly “fully combat-capable” F-35 model now entering production] to the field with shortfalls in capabilities the F-35 needs in combat against current threats.

In other words, they acknowledge that the F-35s rolling off the production line will be unable to even deal with existing threats, let alone future ones. Where’s the accountability?

But the F-35 is a success in other ways. It’s been a perfect way for Congress to move taxpayer money to the defense industry. If the object is to keep Lockheed Martin shareholders happy, the F-35 is a roaring success.

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Trump Signs Bill Containing Warning on Climate Change

The Daily Escape:

The Fuego Volcano in Guatemala erupts under the Milky Way, Antigua, Guatemala – photo by Albert Dros

While we were all focused on the Alabama senate election, on Tuesday, Donald Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a bill that sets spending limits for the US military in the coming fiscal year.

Buried in the bill is a discussion of climate change. The NDAA contains a provision making clear that “the sense of Congress” is that:

Climate change is a direct threat to the national security of the United States.

The provision cites statements from Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, former defense secretary Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr. and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

This creates an interesting moment for Trump, who signed the bill knowing this was in its language. He did not add a signing statement disavowing the provision, so he’s placing the climate change provisions of the NDAA directly opposite his stance on climate change, and his disavowal of the Paris Agreement.

By signing the bill, Trump also ordered a report on “vulnerabilities to military installations” that climate change could cause in the next 20 years. More from the bill:

As global temperatures rise, droughts and famines can lead to more failed states, which are breeding grounds of extremist and terrorist organizations…In the Marshall Islands, an Air Force radar installation built on an atoll at a cost of $1 billion, is projected to be underwater within two decades. A three-foot rise in sea levels will threaten the operations of more than 128 United States military sites, and it is possible that many of these at-risk bases could be submerged in the coming years…

Lawfare reports that the bill’s climate change provision is as important for what it doesn’t require as for what it does. The bill doesn’t require that Gen. Mattis develop a policy to solve the problems that it acknowledges climate change poses. Instead, it merely requires that he provide an explanation of its “effects.”

This was Congress’s way of dealing with an earlier contentious debate about including the climate provision at all. The amendment to deny its inclusion failed by 185-234. Also, the military is not the agency responsible for regulating carbon emissions, so the impact of its requirements on policy may be small.

While the requirement that Mattis produce a report on the “mitigations” that will ensure “resiliency” could be construed as creating a policy response, the fact remains that there is no explicit direction that he implement any of the mitigations on which he’ll be reporting.

More from Lawfare: (brackets and emphasis by the Wrongologist)

According to the Congressional Research Service, as of 2012, the Department of Defense was ‘the largest organizational user of petroleum in the world.’…And the thousands of [military] aircraft…accounted for 22% of all jet fuel used by the US as of 2008.

The bill includes money to buy 30 more planes than the military asked for (24 reliable old F/A-18s instead of 14, and 90 of the newer lemon, the F-35, instead of 70). The US Navy asked for one new Littoral Combat Ship. The NDAA budgets for three.

Translation: $Billions for the aerospace and ship-building government contractors. This year, the Defense expenditures tab will come to about $2,160 for every man, woman and child in the US.

Feel like you’re getting your money’s worth?

 

A quick note about Rock and Roll Hall of Fame nominee Sister Rosetta Tharpe. Most haven’t heard of her, but she was an innovator on the electric guitar. She preferred to play a Gibson SG, and she was among the first to use heavy distortion. In 1947, Sister Rosetta put the then 14-year-old Little Richard on stage. Johnny Cash said that she was his favorite singer, and biggest inspiration. When she plays, you understand where Chuck Berry got his big guitar ideas. Here is Sister Rosetta Tharpe doing “That’s All” from 1964’s “Live in Paris “album:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l9bX5mzdihs

Those who read the Wrongologist in email can view the video here.

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Union-Busting at Pantex

Never heard of Pantex? It is the nation’s only nuclear weapons plant. The full name of the company is Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS) Pantex. CNS is a combination of a who’s who of major defense contractors, including Lockheed Martin, Bechtel, and Booz Allen Hamilton. CNS took over Pantex in March, 2014.

The company assembles, disassembles, and tests nuclear weapon components for the US military. They also manage the storage and surveillance of plutonium pits. (Plutonium Pits? In Texas?)

Pantex is a union shop, and on August 29, more than 1,100 workers went on strike over CNS Pantex’ demand for health care concessions. CNS is also seeking the elimination of defined benefit pensions for new union members. In a statement, Council President Clarence Rashada said:

Wages are not the issue. Benefits, sick leave, medical coverage, prescription drugs, those are the issues.

Since work at Pantex involves exposure to dangerous chemicals and substances, the union is pushing back hard against CNS who is also seeking to shift greater health care costs onto its retirees.

The strike is the first in 45 years at Pantex, and it comes 18 months after CNS took over.

Let’s remember that Texas is a right-to-work state, so the union left one entry gate to Pantex free of picketers to allow managers and other employees to enter the plant without any commotion.

This is right up Scott Walker’s alley. The union-busting Republican governor of Wisconsin is on the campaign trail talking about preventing federal workers from collectively bargaining, creating a national right-to-work law and eliminating the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

And the Pantex union-busting is abetted by the Department of Energy (DOE). The union blames the DOE, arguing that a DOE rule capping worker benefits has put CNS and Pantex employees in untenable positions. By rule, CNS can’t offer employee benefits that would exceed the industry average by 5%. However, the industry baseline also includes manufacturers of cell phones and car parts, so the DOE is comparing labor costs on consumer goods and nuclear weapons, probably an Apple™ to warheads comparison.

Effectively shutting down Pantex over a labor rule that only affects 10% of DOE contractors also speaks volumes about leadership and priorities at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which supervises Pantex and CNS.

The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) reports that in the run-up to the government’s award of the Pantex contract to CNS, CNS claimed it could save taxpayers over $3 billion by cutting redundancies and consolidating management, but NNSA never validated the claim. POGO quotes from a GAO report about the NNSA’s evaluation of the CNS bid:

Did not clearly or completely describe expected benefits and costs…lacked key analyses and assumptions for cost savings estimates…[and] was also missing a description of the unquantified benefits CNS management might or might not offer.

So, maybe it’s a matter of “screw the government” by contractors big and experienced enough to know better. POGO says a series of recent reports have found that NNSA is skimping on upkeep for old buildings, using obsolete fire safety equipment at weapons sites, and relying on broken security sensors to protect uranium stockpiles.

CNS also runs the Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge TN, former home of the Manhattan Project. Y-12’s primary mission today is providing secure storage of nuclear material for both the US and other governments. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists calls Y-12 a “Poster child for a dysfunctional nuclear weapons complex”, noting that although Y-12 has not produced weapons for 25 years, its annual budgets have increased by nearly 50% since 1997, to more than $1 billion a year.

POGO reported that the NNSA spent $50 million on new security systems at Y-12 but couldn’t find a way to get security guards and security sensors working in sync. The overhaul was a result of a July 2012 incident in which a then-82-year-old nun and two others broke into Y-12 to protest the production of nuclear weapons. They made it into the building where most of the US stockpile of highly enriched uranium is stored. The DOE Inspector General found:

Troubling displays of ineptitude in responding to alarms, failures to maintain critical security equipment, over reliance on compensatory measures, misunderstanding of security protocols, poor communications, and weaknesses in contract and resource management.

Follow-on security tests found that the guard force at Y-12 was cheating on evaluations.

You would think that if there’s one place where this cutting corners on safety and security would not be tolerated, it’s with nuclear weapons. CNS has demonstrated in its Y-12 and Pantex situations that competent nuclear weapons handling and security at nuclear weapons facilities should be governmental functions.

They are far too important to be left to a private contractor’s business decision.

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